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We analyze a model of regulated competition in differentiated retail goods and services 
between an incumbent firm, who owns a network good (an essential input) and a potential 
entrant, whose cost of production is private information. The regulator sets the retail prices 
and the access charge that the entrant pays to the incumbent. The decision of the (potential) 
competitor to enter the retail market crucially depends on the regulatory mechanism, and 
consequently the market structure is endogenous. We analyze the efficient mechanism that 
gives rise to a set of “modified” Ramsey prices. We derive a cut-off level of entrant’s marginal 
cost below which the induced market is a duopoly. We show that, under a linear demand 
system, there is inefficient entry compared to the social optimum. 
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 1 Introduction
There are industries where the supply of network, which is a key input in the production of
ﬁnal goods and services, is often monopolized by a vertically integrated ﬁrm, the owner of such
inputs. The challenge then faced by the regulating authority is to design proper access condi-
tions for other ﬁrms in order to promote competition in different market segments. In many
countries there is a sole owner of the local telecom network, and the long distance carriers pay
a stipulated access charge for the use of the local loop to be able to compete in the long distance
call market. This is typically known as “one-way access”. Other examples of such network
are transmission grid (in the generation of electricity), pipelines (in the supply of natural gas),
tracks and stations (in railroad transportation) and local delivery network (in postal services). If
the monopoly owner of the network also competes in the complementary segments of the mar-
ket (e.g. retail services), then this ﬁrm may use its dominant position to foreclose the market.
Hence, the regulator’s task lies in designing access charges that are social welfare enhancing.
The economics of efﬁcient access pricing (Laffont and Tirole[11], and Armstrong, Doyle
and Vickers[2]) aim at deriving pricing schemes that maximize the social welfare taking into
consideration that the ﬁrms break even. The efﬁcient access pricing approach prescribes that,
for each retail product, the associated Lerner index is inversely related to the demand elasticity
(if the ﬁrm is a monopolist) or to the superelasticity of the product (if the ﬁrms compete in a
differentiated duopoly). This approach is popularly known as Ramsey pricing.
In this paper we consider a model of regulated competition to analyze the one-way access
problem. There is an incumbent ﬁrm, the owner of a network input, who faces a potential
competitor in the retail market for a differentiated product (e.g. long distance calls). The cost
of production of the potential entrant is unknown to the regulator, who designs the retail prices
and the access charge. In our model the regulator, in order to maximize social welfare, sets
2a uniform mechanism (retail prices and access charge that do not depend on the costs of the
entrant). Consequently, the competitor’s entry decision crucially depends on the regulatory
mechanism. A low access charge or a high retail price implies that the competitor is more
likely to realize positive proﬁts, and hence is more likely to enter the retail market. As a result,
the market structure is endogenous. In other words, depending on the regulated prices and
access charge, the downstream segment of the market is either served only by the incumbent (a
monopoly situation) or both the incumbent and the entrant operate (a duopoly situation). It is
in this sense that our approach is a departure from the traditional approach to Ramsey pricing
(Laffont and Tirole[11]). In the traditional approach the regulator, while designing the optimal
mechanism, assumes that duopoly prevails in the retail market.1 Thus our approach differs
in what we endogenize the entry decision, and as a consequence the market structure is also
endogenous.
We derive the Ramsey prices both under symmetric and asymmetric information. When the
entrant’s cost is publicly observed, there is a cut-off level of the entrant’s marginal cost above
which entry is socially inefﬁcient, and hence the retail market is a monopoly. The Lerner index
of the incumbent is inversely proportional to its demand elasticity. When the marginal cost falls
below the cut-off level, the regulator allows entry (duopoly regime), and then the Lerner index
of each retail product is inversely proportional to its superelasticity. The cut-off marginal cost
is referred to as the “socially efﬁcient entry point”.
Under asymmetric information (that is, when the entrant’s cost is not publicly observable),
the retail prices are such that the associated Lerner index for each retail product is inversely
related to a “modiﬁed superelasticity”, which is a weighted arithmetic mean of the demand
elasticity in the monopoly regime and the traditional superelasticity (obtained in the symmetric
information case) in a differentiated duopoly. The weights given to each of these two terms
1Laffont and Tirole[11], and Bloch and Gautier[5] consider the impact that the access price may have on the
decision to bypass the existing network.
3depend on the probability of entry. More weight is given to the duopoly superelasticity as the
probability of entry increases. If entry always occurs, then the market structure is a duopoly and
the Lerner index of each ﬁrm is inversely proportional to its superelasticity, which is the case
with the traditional Ramsey pricing approach. Furthermore, if the incumbent’s retail price in a
regulated monopoly situation is higher than that in a regulated duopoly situation, then its retail
price monotonically decreases with the probability of entry. The consequence of entry on the
entrant’s retail price is ambiguous. The retail price of the entrant is lower when the market is
more competitive, i.e., when the probability of entry increases. On the other hand, an increase
in entry also implies that less efﬁcient types enter the market, and this has a positive impact on
its retail price. Depending on the relative importance of these two countervailing effects, the
entrant’s retail price may increase or decrease with the probability of entry.
We also address the issue of optimal entry under asymmetric information and compare it
with socially efﬁcient entry. For this analysis we consider a linear demand system for differen-
tiated products popularized by Singh and Vives[15]. We ﬁrst show that there is a cut-off level
of marginal cost above which entry is not proﬁtable, and hence the retail market is served only
by the incumbent ﬁrm. If the competitor has marginal cost below this cut-off level, then the
retail market is a duopoly. We further show that this cut-off level generically falls below the
socially efﬁcient entry point. In other words, under linear demand and asymmetric information
there is always “too little entry”. By too little entry we mean that there exists some types for
which entry is not proﬁtable though entry, for these types, is socially efﬁcient.
To derive the optimal pricing schemes, we make the following assumptions. First, we as-
sume that the regulator has the power to set the retail and access prices. This implies that the
incumbent is totally passive: it takes prices as given and supplies the quantities that exhaust the
demand for its product at these prices. The entrant is also passive with respect to its supply
decision but it is active with respect to its entry decision. Second, we assume that the regulator
4cannot extract the entrant’s private information on its cost by using a menu of contracts and has
to offer a uniform pricing scheme. This is indeed a source of inefﬁciency but can be justiﬁed by
thenon-discriminatoryrules that aregulatoroften uses indesigningaccess prices.2 The analysis
of the exact implications of the non-discriminatory access requirement is beyond the scope of
the current paper. Interested readers may refer to the discussion in Laffont and Tirole[12], and
Pittman[14]. Offering different self-selecting pricing schemes is not per se a discriminatory
practice since all ﬁrms have access to the same pricing schemes. However, the German com-
petitive authority (the Bundeskartellampt) urged the owner of the rail infrastructure, DB Netz,
to remove its TPS98 tariff for access because it was considered as discriminatory. The TPS98
consisted of two different pricing schemes: a two-part tariff for larger carriers and a per-unit
access charge for smaller carriers (see Pittman[14]).
The current model resembles two strands of the existing literature: the efﬁcient access pric-
ing literature and the literature on regulation with endogenous market structure. There are
two approaches to this latter problem. The ﬁrst one, following Dana and Spier[7], Auriol
and Laffont[3], and Jehiel and Moldovanu[10], considers that the regulator designs the market
structure and selects the ﬁrms which are awarded the right to operate on the retail market as a
function of their reported costs. The other approach assumes that the regulator does not regulate
the market structure ex-ante, but speciﬁes the regulatory environment ignoring the cost of the
competitor(s). When these costs realize, the competitors take the decision on whether or not to
operate in the retail market. Caillaud[6] considers a competitive fringe that has the alternative
technologytobypassaregulatedﬁrm, andmaydecidetodosodependingontheregulatedprice.
Gautier and Mitra[9] consider an environment where the ﬁrms produce homogenous products
and compete sequentially in quantities. In their model, the market structure is endogenous, and
2In the ongoing liberalization process in Europe, the European directives on telecommunication(90/388/EEC),
electricity (96/92/EC),gas (2003/55/EC),rail (2002/14/EC)and postal services (96/67/EC)impose that the owners
of essential facilities must grant access to competitorson the basis of a “transparent and non-discriminatory”tariff.
5they show the possibility of inefﬁcient entry.
As an alternative to Ramsey pricing, the efﬁcient component pricing rule (ECPR) (see Arm-
strong[1], and Baumol, Panzar and Willig[4]) prescribes that the access price should be equal
to the incumbent’sopportunitycost of providingaccess. Under ECPR, (a) potential entrants can
enter the market only if they are more cost efﬁcient and (b) entry is neutral with respect to the
incumbent’s proﬁt. In this approach, entry is endogenous and the market is always served by
the most efﬁcient ﬁrm. Under some conditions (price competition, homogenous products) the
ECPR is equivalent to Ramsey pricing (see Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers[2], and Laffont and
Tirole[12]). Our approach also takes into account, as does the ECPR, the entry decision of the
competitor while designing the retail and access prices. But, we consider an environment where
the regulator’s objective is not the selection of the most efﬁcient ﬁrm but welfare maximization.
Clearly, these two objectives do not coincide when products are differentiated.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with two ﬁrms. Firm 1, the incumbent, is a vertically integrated ﬁrm
which owns a network good (e.g. local loop) that cannot be cheaply duplicated, and it produces
a retail good (long distance calls). Firm 2 is a potential competitor in the retail market that
produces and sells an imperfect substitute of the retail good produced by ﬁrm 1. Production of
one unit of a retail good uses a unit of the network good. If the retail market is served by at
least one ﬁrm, the incumbent has to produce positive amount of the network for which it incurs
a ﬁxed cost k0 and per unit cost c0 > 0. The production of the retail good i involves a constant
positive marginal cost ci for i = 1, 2. Suppose ﬁrm i produces an amount xi ≥ 0 of its retail
good. Then the total cost for ﬁrm 1 to provide network is k0+c0(x1+x2). If ﬁrm 2 operates in
the retail market then it has to pay a per unit access charge a.
6The cost parameters k0, c0 and c1 of the incumbent ﬁrm is publicly observable. Entrant’s
marginal cost c2 is distributed according to a probability distribution function G(c2) in the
support [c2, ¯ c2] ⊂ R++. Let g(c2) be the continuous and differentiable density associated with
G(c2). The probability distribution of c2 is common knowledge, and we assume that g(c2) > 0
for all c2 ∈ [c2, ¯ c2].
We consider a fully regulated market where a utilitarian regulator sets the retail prices p1
and p2 and the access charge a in order to maximize social welfare. We adopt the accounting
convention that the regulator collects the total sales revenue of ﬁrm 1, p1x1, and reimburses
the incumbent its costs of network with monetary transfers, and that the entrant pays the total
access receipt, ax2, directly to ﬁrm 1. Since the net utility of the incumbent ﬁrm must be non-
negative, the welfare maximization problem induces prices that are similar to Ramsey prices.
In this environment, the only decision ﬁrm 2 takes is whether or not to sell a positive quantity
of its retail good depending on the regulatory mechanism.
Regulating retail prices in addition to the access conditions is of particular importance when
the entrant ﬁrm possesses market power in the downstream segment. The regulator needs at
least two instruments, namely, the retail price (to regulate its supply) and the access charge
(to regulate its contribution to the network ﬁnancing), with both instruments having an impact
on the entry decision.3 Had the entrant belonged to a competitive fringe, only one regulatory
instrument (say, the access charge) would have been sufﬁcient.
Consumers have quasilinear preferences. The gross consumer surplus from the downstream
products is given by U(x1, x2), where U is the indirect utility function. Demand functions are
3Alternatively, the regulator can use a two-part tariff, where the variable part aims at regulating its supply and
the ﬁxed part is used for regulating its contribution to the network ﬁnancing. Gautier and Mitra[9], and Lewis and




U(x1, x2)− p1x1− p2x2.
When any oneof the two ﬁrms is inactive(i.e., product j is not supplied), the monopolydemand
for product i is found by solving the above problem with xj = 0.4






1(p1, p2), if ﬁrm 2 enters,
xm
1 (p1, .), if ﬁrm 2 does not enter.
The demand faced by ﬁrm 2 is x2 = xd
2(p1, p2). Let hi and hij, for i, j = 1, 2, be the own and
cross price elasticities of xd
i , respectively, and let e1 be the own price elasticity of xm
1 . Products
are substitutes if hij > 0 for i, j = 1, 2, and i  = j and complements if hij < 0.
The timing of the events is as follows. Firm 2 learns its marginal cost c2 privately. Then
the regulator sets the regulatory mechanism (p1, p2, a). After being offered the mechanism
(p1, p2, a), ﬁrm 2 makes the entry decision. If it decided to enter the retail market, the ﬁrms
sell quantities xd
i (p1, p2) for i = 1, 2. Otherwise, ﬁrm 1 sells quantity xm
1 (p1, .) as a monopolist
in the downstream market. In the following sections, we analyze the optimal regulatory mech-
anism both under symmetric (when the marginal cost of ﬁrm 2 is known to the regulator) and
asymmetric information.
4The monopoly demand function is equal to the duopoly demand function for good i when ﬁrm j charges a
limit price such that, at this limit price, the demand for good j is equal to zero.
83 Optimal Regulation under Symmetric Information
3.1 Duopoly Market Structure
In this section we assume that c2 is publicly observable. First we consider the case of a duopoly
market. The utilitarian regulator maximizes social welfare by setting the retail prices (p1, p2)
and the access charge a. The welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumers and producers surplus.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the regulator reimburses costs of the incumbent
ﬁrm through a monetary transfer t, receives the sales revenue of the incumbent from the retail
market, and that the entrant pays the total access fee directly to the incumbent ﬁrm. In order to








1, which has a shadow price 1+l (with l > 0). Hence, the



























, is assumed to be con-
cave. Given the regulatory mechanism, both the ﬁrms must break even. The regulator makes a
transfer of amount t to the incumbent ﬁrm and this ﬁrm is paid a total access receipt ax2 by the
entrant. The sum of these two terms, which is its proﬁt, must be non-negative.
Pd
1 ≡ t+a xd
2 ≥ 0. (2)
On the other hand, the net proﬁt of the entrant must also be non-negative, i.e.,
Pd
2 ≡ (p2−c2−a)xd
2 ≥ 0. (3)
9The above restrictions are the participation constraints of ﬁrms 1 and 2, respectively. The opti-




Sincepublicfundsarecostly(l >0), theparticipationconstraintofﬁrm 1bindsattheoptimum.
Also, the access price a is set to ensure that ﬁrm 2 breaks even. Taking these facts into account,






















In the following proposition we describe the optimal mechanism as a solution to the regulator’s
maximization problem.
Proposition 1 The optimal regulatory mechanism (pd
1, pd
2, ad) under symmetric information is












, for i = 1, 2, (5)
ad = pd











, for i, j = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix A. ||
10The superelasticity of good i = 1, 2 takes into account the fact that the two ﬁrms sell dif-
ferentiated products in the retail market. If the goods are substitutes (complements) we have
ˆ hi < (>)hi. Further, the Lerner index Ld
i of ﬁrm i is inversely related to its superelasticity. In
the above proposition the formula for the optimal access price has a very simple interpretation.
Had the public fund not been costly (i.e., if l = 0), the regulator would optimally set the access
charge equal to the marginal cost of ﬁrm 1 for providing access to the entrant (i.e., ad = c0).
Since public funds are costly due to distortionary taxes, the optimal access charge is the sum
of the marginal cost of providing access and a markup involving the superelasticity of the retail
good supplied by ﬁrm 2 in the downstream market. The magnitude of this markup depends
positively on the shadow cost of public funds.
3.2 Monopoly Market Structure
Consider the case of a monopoly downstream market, i.e., the incumbent faces no rival in this





Hence, the net consumer surplus is given by:
Vm ≡U (xm





In this case also ﬁrm 1 must break even. Notice that, since ﬁrm 2 does not enter the market, the
incumbent does not have to provide access, and hence does not get any access receipt. Its cost
is only reimbursed through the net transfer t ≥ 0 from the regulator. This is the participation
constraint of the incumbent ﬁrm, which binds at the optimum. Incorporating the participation






The optimal retail price pm
1 is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The optimal retail price pm














Proof. See Appendix A. ||
In this case the Lerner index of ﬁrm 1 is inversely related to the own price elasticity of its
retail product. It is immediate to show that if ˆ h1 > e1, the regulated price of good 1 is higher
in the case of monopoly than that in duopoly. If the demands are not “too” concave, then at a
given price p1, h1 ≥ (≤)e1 if the products are substitutes (complements). But we cannot infer
from the substitute or complement nature of the goods whether ˆ h1 is greater or smaller than e1.
In our linear demand example in Section 5 we have h1 > ˆ h1 = e1 for substitutes products, and
h1 < ˆ h1 = e1 for complements.
3.3 Socially Optimum Entry Point
Now we would like to see if, under symmetric information, entry is socially efﬁcient. In other
words, we would look for a cut-off level of marginal cost of ﬁrm 2 such that if c2 is different
from this cut-off level, maximum social welfare associated to duopoly differs from that in the
case of monopoly. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a cut-off level of entrant’s marginal cost, c∗
2 such that if the entrant’s
12marginal cost falls below this level then the maximized value of social welfare in duopoly retail
market is higher than that in the monopoly situation, and hence entry is socially efﬁcient. If the
entrant has marginal cost above this cut-off level, then entry is not socially efﬁcient, and the
retail market is served only by ﬁrm 1.
Proof. See Appendix A. ||
The cut-off level of the marginal cost of ﬁrm 2, c∗
2, which is referred to as the “socially
optimal entry point”, is found by equating the maximized values of welfare in the duopoly and
the monopoly regimes. For low values of ﬁrm 2’s marginal cost (i.e., c2 ≤ c∗
2) allowing ﬁrm
2 to operate in the downstream segment of the market is socially efﬁcient (since, in this case,
the social welfare is higher). If the entrant’s marginal cost is very high (i.e., c2 > c∗
2), then
prohibiting ﬁrm 2 to enter the downstream market and allowing ﬁrm 1 to be the sole supplier of
the retail good is socially optimal.
4 Optimal Regulation under Asymmetric Information
In this section we assume that ﬁrm 2 learns its marginal cost privately before the regulator
designs the mechanism (p1, p2, a) and that the distribution, G(c2), is common knowledge. The
regulatory mechanism is non-discriminatoryin the sense that it does not depend on the marginal
cost of ﬁrm 2. After observing theregulatory mechanism, ﬁrm 2 takes itsentry decision. Hence,
the regulator, while designing the mechanism, knows that ﬁrm 2 may enter the market with
some probability. As opposed to the case of symmetric information, the regulator maximizes
the expected value of the social welfare, since the retail market is served by both the ﬁrms with
some probability, and only by the incumbent with the complementary probability. The optimal
regulatory mechanism has signiﬁcant impact on the entry decision of ﬁrm 2.
134.1 The Regulatory Problem
After being offered the regulatory mechanism ﬁrm 2 decides to enter the retail market if it earns
non-negative proﬁts, i.e., if Pd
2 ≡ (p2−c2−a)xd
2(p1, p2) ≥ 0. We assume that at the regulated
prices (p1, p2), ﬁrm 2 faces strictly positive demand for its product, i.e., xd
2(p1, p2) > 0. Now
deﬁne a cut-off marginal cost of ﬁrm 2, ˆ c2 such that Pd
2(ˆ c2) = 0. At prices (p1,p2,a), we have
¶Pd
2/¶c2 < 0. Therefore ﬁrm 2 is active in the downstream market only if c2 ≤ ˆ c2. Given
the assumption of positive demand for the retail product of ﬁrm 2, the cut-off entry point ˆ c2 is
deﬁned by
p2− ˆ c2−a = 0. (10)
Thus, given the regulatory mechanism, it is clear that the cut-off marginal cost of ﬁrm 2, and
hence the market structure (duopoly or monopoly) are endogenous. From the above discussion
we can immediately conclude that with probability G(ˆ c2) the market structure is a duopoly, and
the incumbent is a monopolist in the retail market with the complementary probability.
Irrespective of whether ﬁrm 2 enters the market or not, ﬁrm 1 receives the monetary transfer
t from the regulator to reimburse its cost. If ﬁrm 2 enters the retail market (with probability
G(ˆ c2)), then only the incumbent receives the access charge. The participation constraint of ﬁrm
1 then implies that the expected proﬁt is non-negative, i.e.,
EP1 ≡ t +G(ˆ c2)axd
2(p1, p2) ≥ 0. (11)
The optimal regulatory mechanism (p1, p2, a) results from, subject to (10) and (11), the maxi-
14mization of
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ˆ c2
[{U (xm




1 (p1, .))}+t]dG(c2)] (12)
It is easy to check that the above optimization problem is strictly concave. Given (10), the
regulator choosing a mechanism (p1, p2, a) is equivalent to choosing (p1, p2, ˆ c2). Since pub-
lic funds are costly, the participation constraint of ﬁrm 1 binds at the optimum. Hence, the
regulator’s objective reduces to:
max
p1,p2, ˆ c2
G(ˆ c2)  Wd(ˆ c2)+[1−G(ˆ c2)]Wm+xd
2(p1, p2)
  ˆ c2
c2
G(c2)dc2, (13)
whereWm is deﬁned in (8), and   Wd(ˆ c2) is given by



















The ﬁrst term in (13) is the expected social welfare with duopoly evaluated at the entrant’s
marginal cost ˆ c2, the second term is the expected social welfare under monopoly and the last
term measures the expected beneﬁt of having an entrant producing the quantity xd
2(p1,p2) at
marginal cost c2 rather than at ˆ c2, i.e., the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm 2 for having entered with a
more efﬁcient type than ˆ c2.
154.2 The Modiﬁed Superelasticity
In the optimal regulatory mechanism under asymmetric information, the Lerner index of each
retail product is inversely related to a “modiﬁed superelasticity” which is composed of the own
price elasticity and the standard superelasticity (the one that has been derived under symmetric
information). Prior to analyzing the optimal regulatory mechanism, we discuss the properties
of these modiﬁed superelasticities. Let the average demands of the retail goods 1 and 2, respec-
tively be
¯ x1(p1, p2) = G(ˆ c2)xd
1(p1, p2)+[1−G(ˆ c2)]xm
1 (p1, .) (14)
¯ x2(p1, p2) = G(ˆ c2)xd
2(p1, p2). (15)
Further, let ¯ hi and ¯ hij be the own and cross price elasticities associated with these average
demands, which are given by
¯ hi = −
















¯ hi ¯ hj − ¯ hij ¯ hji
 
¯ hi ¯ hj + ¯ hi ¯ hij
, for i, j = 1, 2, and i  = j. (18)
The above modiﬁed superelasticities are similar to those in case of symmetric information.
Under unknown marginal cost of ﬁrm 2, the terms hi, hij and hji in ˆ hi are replaced by ¯ hi, ¯ hij
and ¯ hji in ˆ hG
i , respectively. In other words, the modiﬁed superelasticities are deﬁned in terms
of the expected demands. Therefore, they depend on the entry decision of ﬁrm 2 (since G(ˆ c2)
16is the fraction of cost types that enter the retail market). It is worth noting a few important
properties of the modiﬁed superelasticities described in (18). First, the modiﬁed superelasticity
of retail good i (=1,2) can be expressed as a weighted arithmetic mean of its superelasticity
obtained under symmetric information and its own price elasticity. Take the retail product of
ﬁrm i. Its modiﬁed superelasticity can be written as the following.5
ˆ hG
1 = q1(ˆ c2)ˆ h1+[1−q1(ˆ c2)]e1, (19)
ˆ hG




The weights depend on the probability of entry, G(ˆ c2). Had all types of ﬁrm 2 been allowed
to enter the retail market, i.e., if ˆ c2 = ¯ c2, then qi(ˆ c2) equals 1 for i = 1, 2. In this case, the
retail market is duopoly with probability 1, and the modiﬁed superelasticities coincide with the
superelasticities derived under symmetric information, ˆ h1 and ˆ h2, respectively. If no types of
ﬁrm 2 are allowed entry, i.e., ˆ c2 = c2, then the retail market is served only by the incumbent,
and hence, ˆ hG
1 equals e1, the own price elasticity associated with the monopoly demand faced
by ﬁrm 1. In this case, ﬁrm 2 does not produce, and its own price elasticity is not well deﬁned.
From (20) it is easy to show that as G(.) approaches zero, ˆ hG
2 tends to h2.
Next, important property is related to the behavior of modiﬁed superelasticities vis-à-vis the




≷ 0 as ˆ h1 ≷ e1.
Hence, the modiﬁed superelasticities can either increase or decrease montonically as the prob-
ability of entry increases. In fact, both ˆ hG
1 and ˆ hG
2 move in the same direction with respect to
5See Appendix B for details.
17the probability of entry.6
Finally, notice that if the retail goods are (imperfect) substitutes, then ¯ hij > 0 for i, j = 1, 2
and i  = j. Then one can immediately show that in this case ˆ hG
i < ¯ hi for i = 1, 2. The inequality
is reversed if the products are complements.
4.3 Efﬁcient Prices and Access Charge
In this subsection we analyse the optimal regulatory mechanism as a solution to the welfare
maximization problem (13) of the regulator. The optimal retail prices and the access charge
are modiﬁed Ramsey prices which takes the endogeneity of the market structure into account.
These are described in the following proposition. The mechanism is efﬁcient in the sense that
it maximises the expected social welfare.
Proposition 4 Under asymmetric information, the welfare maximizing prices (p1, p2,a) are























(1+l)(ˆ c2−c2)−(ˆ c2−m2(ˆ c2))
p2(1+l)
, (22)










where m2(ˆ c2) = E[c2|c2 ≤ ˆ c2] = ˆ c2 −
  ˆ c2
c2 G(c2)dc2
G(ˆ c2) is the expected marginal cost conditional on
entry.
Proof. See Appendix B. ||
6The above two properties should be interpreted with caution. They are valid for exogenous values of ˆ c2. In
the subsequent sections we show that the entry decision, and hence, ˆ c2 are endogenously determined. Thus at the
optimum, the behavior of modiﬁed superelasticities with respect to the probability of entry is somehow redundant.
18When themarginalcostofﬁrm2 isunknown,theLernerindexofﬁrm 1isequaltoaRamsey
like term, which is inversely proportional to the modiﬁed superelasticity of its product. It takes
into account that the retail market is a duopoly with probability G(ˆ c2). Therefore, the Lerner
index of ﬁrm 1 can be expressed as a weighted mean of the Lerner index of the incumbent under
monopoly and that under duopoly with symmetric information.
Corollary 1 Under asymmetric information, the Lerner index of ﬁrm 1 is a weighted harmonic
mean of Ld
1 and Lm
1 , the weights being functions of the probability of entry.
Proof. See Appendix B. ||
The above corollary immediately follows from (19). This result implies that if ˆ c2 = c2,
ˆ hG
1 = e1, and hence we have LG
1 = Lm
1 . Similarly, if entry always occurs with probability 1 (i.e.,
ˆ c2 = ¯ c2), then we have LG
1 = Ld
1.
The optimal retail price of good 2 is determined from (22). The Lerner index of ﬁrm 2
consists of three terms which we explain below.
1. The ﬁrst term is a Ramsey like term which is inversely proportional to the modiﬁed su-
perelasticity of the product.
2. The second term depends positively on the ratio of the difference between ˆ c2 and the true
realization of c2 to the price of good 2. In the optimal non-discriminatory mechanism,
all types c2 face the same price p2. Consequently, all the types that ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
enter the downstream market enter and sell the same quantity xd
2 at price p2. However, the
proﬁt level of an entrant is type-contingent and it increases monotonically with its level
of cost efﬁciency (that is, lower the marginal cost higher is the proﬁt). This is captured in
the second term.
3. The third term depends negatively on the ratio of the difference between the cost of the
19marginal entrant and the expected cost of the potential entrant (given the entry cut-off ˆ c2)
to the mark up price (1+l)p2 where the mark up internalizes the shadow cost l. This is
the common cost of all potential entrants (that is, entrants with type c2 ≤ ˆ c2).




and we call this the “impact-of-entry” term. The role of the “impact of entry term” becomes
more transparent if one re-writes the Lerner index of ﬁrm 2 (that is, condition (22)) as a ‘virtual’
Lerner index of ﬁrm 2 in the following way:
LG










where z(ˆ c2) is the virtual cost of the endogenously determined marginal entrant ˆ c2 under the
optimal non-discriminatory regulatory mechanism,7 which is given by
z(ˆ c2) = ˆ c2−




Therefore, the pricing rule under asymmetric information is such that the virtual Lerner index
of ﬁrm 2 is inversely related to the modiﬁed superelasticity.
We now analyze the impact of the endogenous probability of entry on the regulated prices.
Under symmetric information, the Lerner index of ﬁrm 1 in case of duopoly may be higher or
lower than that of monopoly depending on whether ˆ h1 is lower or higher than e1, and hence
the retail price pd
1 may be higher or lower than the retail price pm
1 . We can conclude that, if
pd
1 ≤ (≥)pm
1 , then a greater probability of entry is associated with a lower (higher) price for
7In the objective function (13), we have
¶ ˆ Wd(ˆ c2)
¶ ¯ x2 = (1+l)(p2−c0−z(ˆ c2)).
20good 1.
In case of the regulated price of ﬁrm 2, a similar monotonicity result cannot be drawn.
Higher probability of entry has the same qualitative impact on the Ramsey term in (21) as on
that in (22). But a higher probability of entry also has a positive impact on the virtual marginal
cost z(ˆ c2) and hence on the retail price p2. Hence, if pm
1 ≥ pd
1, the impact of a higher probability
of entry on the regulated retail price p2 is ambiguous.
In line with the traditional approach to efﬁcient access pricing as in Laffont and Tirole[11],
whenthecostoftheentrantisunknowntotheregulator,theﬁrmsareofferedamenuofcontracts
(p1(c2), p2(c2), a(c2)). Consequently, entry and hence the market structure are perfectly regu-
lated. There is no entry decision per se made by ﬁrm 2. In the current paper we set up a model
similar to that in Laffont and Tirole[11] in order to derive welfare maximising retail and access
prices thatalsotakeefﬁciententry decisionintoaccount, butweadd anon-discriminatoryclause
to the problem. This impliesthat prices cannot be contingenton a revealed value of the entrant’s
marginal cost. Our modiﬁed Ramsey prices bear close relation to the optimal regulatory mech-
anism based on the “revelation principle”, as analyzed by Laffont and Tirole[11]. Following























where h(c2) = G(c2)/g(c2), the hazard rate associated with the distribution function G(c2).8 In
light of (25), ﬁrm 1 always receives an efﬁcient (non-distortionary) contract since its charac-
teristics are public information. This is not the case with ﬁrm 2. In (26), the Ramsey markup
8These contracts apply only if, under asymmetric information, a duopoly market structure is prefered to a
monopoly which is the case for all types of ﬁrm 2 such that c2+h(c2) ≤ c∗
2.
21term involves the superelasticity of good 2, and the additional term is an “incentive correction”
term that depends on the hazard rate. The most efﬁcient type of ﬁrm 2 (c2 = c2) receives a non-
distortionary contract, i.e., the optimal contract under symmetric information. In our pricing
formula (21) superelasticity of good 1 is replaced by its modiﬁed superelasticity in the markup
term. Hence ﬁrm 1 does not receive an efﬁcient contract, since at the time of designing the
regulatory contract, ﬁrm 2’s entry decision is not known. Only when the retail market is served
by both the ﬁrms with probability 1 (i.e., ˆ c2 = ¯ c2), ﬁrm 1 receives an efﬁcient contract, since
ˆ hG
1 = ˆ h1.
In our model it is impossible to offer a non-distortionary contract to ﬁrm 2, since entry
cannot be perfectly regulated. An alternate way of representing ﬁrm 2’s Lerner index (that is,



















A comparison between (26) and (27) shows that our Lerner index differs both in the Ramsey
type term as well as in the adjustment term. While the Ramsey type term differs mainly because
of the endogenous market structure, the adjustment term differs mainly because, as opposed to
the traditional approach where entry is exogenously given, in our problem the endogenously
determined entry cut-off point ˆ c2 matters.
4.4 Endogenous Entry
We analyze how the optimal cut-off point for entry ˆ c2 is related to the socially efﬁcient entry
point c∗
2. Under asymmetric information entry is inefﬁcient if ˆ c2 differs from c∗
2. There are two
possibleformsofinefﬁciency: “excess entry”underasymmetricinformationif ˆ c2 >c∗
2, and“too
22little entry” if ˆ c2 < c∗
2. To be more speciﬁc, too little entry refers to the situation if the entry
cut-off point under asymmetric information, ˆ c2 falls below the socially optimal entry point, c∗
2.
In other words, there are values of marginal cost of ﬁrm 2 (c2 ∈ [ˆ c2, c∗
2]) allowing whom to
enter the retail market is socially desirable, but under the optimal regulatory mechanism these
types do not enter since they do not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to do so. In a related work, Gautier and
Mitra[9] show that if the incumbent and entrant produce a non-differentiated good then, under
asymmetric information, entry is generically inefﬁcient and that both types of inefﬁciencies
are possible. Thus, there is no systematic bias towards any particular form of inefﬁciency. In
more speciﬁc contexts, i.e., using speciﬁc assumptions on the distribution of the entrant’s cost
parameter, Bloch and Gautier[5], and Gautier[8] identify situations where a particular type of
inefﬁcient entry emerges. Gautier[8] observes that there is too little entry with both two-part
and single tariffs for the access charge, the latter generating more entry. Bloch and Gautier[5]
study the choice between access and bypass as a function of the regulated access price. They
identify a situation where, under asymmetric information, excessive bypass is possible, while
excess access does not emerge.
In our set-up, the optimal cut-off of the marginal cost of ﬁrm 2 is given by
  Wd(ˆ c2)−Wm = lh(ˆ c2)xd
2(p1, p2). (28)
From the above ﬁrst order condition, we can only conclude that there is entry if and only if the
duopoly welfare evaluated at the marginal entrant’s marginal cost is higher than the monopoly
welfare. Otherwise, there is no entry. To draw an explicit conclusion regarding the types of
inefﬁciencies, we analyze a differentiated good retail market with linear demands.
235 Optimal Regulation with Linear Demands
We assume that the consumers have quasilinear preferences over the retail products (x1, x2) and
a numeraire good z. Thus, consumers maximize U(x1, x2)+z subject to p1x1+ p2x2+z ≤ I,
where I represents consumers’ total wealth. As in Singh and Vives[15], we assume that the
gross surplus over the products of the two ﬁrms is a quadratic function.









We assume that ai, bi, bibj−b2, and aibj−ajb are all positive for i, j = 1, 2.
When theretailmarket isservedby boththeﬁrms, theﬁrst orderconditionoftheconsumer’s
optimization problem gives rise to the inverse demand functions.
p1(x1, x2) = a1−b1x1−bx2,
p2(x1, x2) = a2−b2x2−bx1.
For a monopoly retail market, we have x2 = 0 and hence, the gross consumers’ surplus is given
by.





Hence, the inverse demand function is given by:
p1 = a1−b1x1.
For substitute products (b > 0), we have h1 > e1 = ˆ h1, and h1 < e1 = ˆ h1 if the products
are complements (b < 0). Hence under perfect information, efﬁcient prices are such that the
monopoly price equals the duopoly price for good 1.
245.1 Efﬁcient Prices under Symmetric Information
In a duopolyretail market, using Proposition1 oneobtains theoptimal prices and access charge,






















In this particular case with linear demands, the regulated retail prices of ﬁrm 1’s product under
symmetric information are equal. But this is not necessarily the case under a general demand
structure. The welfare differential between the two regimes is given by









FollowingProposition3, ifc2 liesin theinterval[c2, c∗
2], thenasociallyoptimalmarketstructure
is duopolistic. For c∗
2 < c2 ≤ ¯ c2, the incumbent ﬁrm operates as a monopolist in the retail
market. Notice that, for a1 = a2 and b1 = b2 = b (i.e., when the downstream products are
perfect substitutes), we have c∗
2 = c1. This implies that, if the products are homogeneous,
then ﬁrm 2 is allowed to operate in the retail market only if it is more cost-efﬁcient than the
incumbent ﬁrm.
255.2 Efﬁcient Prices under Asymmetric Information
The ﬁrst order conditions for the regulator’s optimization problem with respect to p1 and p2




















The optimal entry cut-off point ˆ c2 is found by solving the ﬁrst order condition (28) of the
regulator’s maximization problem. For linear demands, this is given by
(1+l)2[y−t(ˆ c2)]
2−2l(1+l)b1h(ˆ c2)[y−t(ˆ c2)]−b2
1R(ˆ c2)[R(ˆ c2)+2lh(ˆ c2)] = 0, (31)
where t(ˆ c2) ≡ b1(ˆ c2−c2), and y ≡ b1(a2−c0−c2)−b(a1−c0−c1).
5.3 Optimal Entry
Finally we analyze whether entry is efﬁcient or inefﬁcient compared to the social optimum.
Observe that using the value of c∗
2 we get y−t(ˆ c2) = b1(c∗
2− ˆ c2). Using this in condition (31)
and then simplifying it, we get
[(1+l)(c∗
2− ˆ c2)+R(ˆ c2)][(1+l)(c∗
2− ˆ c2)−R(ˆ c2)−2lh(ˆ c2)] = 0. (31′)
26From (31′) it follows that the optimal ˆ c2 satisﬁes any one of the following conditions:




2 = 0 (32)




2 = 0. (33)
Let ˆ c′
2 and ˆ c′′
2 be the solutions to Q1(ˆ c2) = 0 and Q2(ˆ c2) = 0, respectively.9 Clearly, from
(32) and (33) it follows that ˆ c′′
2 < c∗
2 < ˆ c′
2, and hence the welfare maximizing solution is ˆ c′′
2.
Then from (33) we have c∗
2 > ˆ c′′
2. Thus there is “too little entry”. For example, consider the






.10 For any element from this family, Qi(ˆ c2) = 0 has a unique solution






2 given k > −1.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have argued how the traditional Ramsey access pricing rule can be modiﬁed
when market structure is endogenous. This modiﬁcation is necessary only when the cost of the
entrant is unknown. In this regard we derive modiﬁed superelasticities of the retail goods that
internalize the impact of the regulatory pricing rule on the entry decision.
Popular belief asserts that access to essential facility should be non-discriminatory. Follow-
ing this tradition we have designed a non-discriminatory pricing rule and argued that such a
pricing rule, when designed by a utilitarian regulator, has a signiﬁcant impact on the entry de-
cision of the rival ﬁrm as the regulator cannot perfectly control the entry into the retail market.
9It can be proved that Qi(ˆ c2) = 0 for i = 1, 2 will never have imaginary conjugate solution(s).
10For k = 0, G0(.) is Uniform.
27Taking resort to a linear demand system we have shown that there is too little entry compared to
the socially efﬁcient entry and this conclusion holds under very general distribution functions
of the unknown marginal cost of the entrant.
We assumed that the potential entrant possesses market power instead of being part of a
competitive fringe. When the entrant is assumed to be competitive, one can also draw conclu-
sions that are similar to the ones we ﬁnd here. An interesting extension of the current model
would be to consider a partially regulated industry where the regulator only designs the access
fee (possibly a two-part tariff), and the ﬁrms compete in a Bertrand fashion in the downstream
market. A more challenging open question in this context will be to design the regulatory mech-
anism when it is possible for the regulator to offer a menu of contracts to the entrant.
Appendix A
Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 First consider the regulator’s problem (4) under symmet-










































Solving the above system of equations and incorporating the fact that a = p2 −c2 we get (5)
and (6).
Now consider the regulator’s optimization problem (8) under symmetric information. The











28Solving the above we get (9).
Proof of Proposition 3 To provethis proposition, let ˜ Wd(c2) and ˜ Wm be the maximum values





The above implies that the function ˜ Wd(c2) is monotonically decreasing with respect to c2.
Notice that ˜ Wm does not depend on c2. Three cases might emerge. (1) Suppose ﬁrst that
˜ Wd(c2) < ˜ Wm. In this case c∗
2 = c2. This implies that welfare under monopoly is always higher
than that under duopoly, and hence, even the most efﬁcient type of ﬁrm 2 is not allowed to enter.
Thus, the socially optimal market structure is that the retail market is served only by ﬁrm 1. (2)
Now suppose that ˜ Wd(¯ c2) > ˜ Wm. In this case c∗
2 = ¯ c2. Then welfare under duopoly is always
higher than that under monopoly, and hence, even the least efﬁcient type of ﬁrm 2 is allowed to
enter. (3) Finally, suppose that ˜ Wd(¯ c2) < ˜ Wm < ˜ Wd(c2). In this case we have c∗
2 ∈ (c2, ¯ c2) such
that ˜ Wd(c∗
2) = ˜ Wm.
Appendix B
Properties of the Modiﬁed Superelasticity We ﬁrst prove the property that the modiﬁed
superelasticities can be expressed as a weighted arithmetic mean of own price elasticities and
the traditional superelasticities. First, consider the case of ﬁrm 1. Its modiﬁed superelasticity


















¯ x1(¯ h2+ ¯ h12)
 
e1,
= [q1(ˆ c2)] ˆ h1+[1−q1(ˆ c2)]e1.


















= [q2(ˆ c2)] ˆ h2+[1−q2(ˆ c2)]d h2,
where d = e1
e1+h21.
Notice that qi(ˆ c2)=1 (for i=1, 2) when ˆ c2 = ¯ c2 (i.e., the retail market is a duopoly). When
no types of ﬁrm 2 are allowed to enter, i.e., G(.) = 0, we have q1(ˆ c2) = 0 and ˆ hG
1 equals e1,
since this ﬁrm is a monopolist in the retail market. In case of ﬁrm 2 a similar conclusion can
be drawn. As G(ˆ c2) approaches zero, the modiﬁed superelasticity of ﬁrm 2 approaches its price
elasticity associated with the duopoly demand, xd
2(p1, p2). Obviously, at G(.) = 0, this ﬁrm
does not supply a positive quantity, and hence, the value of ˆ hG
2 at this point is not well deﬁned.
Next weanalyzethebehaviorofthemodiﬁedsuperelasticitieswithrespect to theprobability








≷ 0 as ˆ h2 ≷ dh2.
30It is easy to show that ˆ h1 ≷ e1 and ˆ h2 ≷ dh2 are equivalent conditions. Notice that
ˆ h1 ≷ e1
⇔ h1h2−h12h21 ≷ e1(h2+h12), (34)
and







⇔ e1(h1h2−h12h21)+h12(h1h2−h12h21) ≷ e1(h1h2+h21h2)
⇔ h21(h1h2−h12h21) ≷ e1h21(h2+h12)
⇔ h1h2−h12h21 ≷ e1(h2+h12). (35)
Finally, notice that ¯ x1 ¯ h12 = G(ˆ c2)xd
1h12 and ¯ h21 = h21. Hence, if the goods are substitutes
(complements), i.e., if hij > (<)0 for i = 1, 2, then we have ¯ hij > (<)0 for i = 1, 2. Thus
ˆ hi < (>)hi is equivalent to ˆ hG
i < (>)¯ hi for i = 1, 2.
Proof of Proposition 4 First notice that the regulator’s objective function (12) is the sum of
socialwelfareunderduopolyandthatundermonopoly. Theregulatormaximizesthisexpression
subject to (10) and (11), both of which bind at the optimum. Binding (10) deﬁnes the optimal
entry cut-off ˆ c2. Hence, a regulatory mechanism (p1, p2, a) can equivalently be represented by
a mechanism (p1, p2, ˆ c2). Incorporating the constraints into the objective function (12) we get

















































Solving the above system of equations, and using (10) and the expression for m2(ˆ c2) we get
(21), (22) and (23).
Proof of Corollary 1 This corollary follows directly from the condition (19) and Proposition
4.
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